7-11 July 2014
Africa/Johannesburg timezone
<a href="http://events.saip.org.za/internalPage.py?pageId=16&confId=34"><font color=#0000ff>SAIP2014 Proceedings published on 17 April 2015</font></a>

Finite-size key security of Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 quantum-key-distribution protocol

10 Jul 2014, 10:20
D Les 104

D Les 104

Oral Presentation Track G - Theoretical and Computational Physics Theoretical


Dr Mhlambululi Mafu (UKZN)

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Prof. F. Petruccione, petruccione@ukzn.ac.za, University of KwaZulu-Natal

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Based on the post-selection technique which was introduced by Christandl, Ko ̈nig and Renner [Phys Rev. Lett. 102, 020504 (2009)] in order to simplify the security of quantum key distribu- tion schemes, we study the security of the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 quantum key distribution protocol. The postselection technique has been proposed and some examples have been shortly described in the literature. Therefore, we present the details of the security proof for a specific realistic protocol. We also give bounds on the secret key rates for the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 protocol by using the post selection technique when given a finite amount of resources.

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