Speaker
Dr
Mpho Tshivhase
(University of Pretoria)
Description
The existence of these humanoid robots forces us to think about or rethink the issues concerning rights, citizenship, and personhood. There is something quite different about robots in relation to persons. I am particularly interested to test the plausibility of considering the uniqueness of robots. My aim is to consider the radical distinction of robots. I will test the uniqueness of robots against my theory of procedural uniqueness. Given that my view of uniqueness is founded on persons, it is necessary for my discussion of the uniqueness of robots to be preceded by a discussion of personhood with the aim to reveal whether robots can have the status of personhood. The question regarding the possibility of robots attaining personhood status is one that assumes that robots can develop moral status and thus able to take accountability for moral actions. Understood in this way, it would imply that robots would have the capacity to grasp the concept of moral responsibility so much so that they would be able to understand moral regard for other robots, humans, and animals. While legal personhood can be granted to robots in the same way that it is granted to historical buildings and corporations, it is unclear that robots can be persons in the way that thinkers such as Kant and Menkiti and others conceive of it.
Primary author
Dr
Mpho Tshivhase
(University of Pretoria)
