Finite-size key in QKD protocols for Rényi entropies

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Abstract. A realistic quantum key distribution protocol necessarily runs with finite resources. This is in contrast to the existing quantum key distribution security proofs which are asymptotic in the sense that certain parameters are exceedingly large as compared to practical realistic values. In this paper, we derive bounds on the secret key rates for the B92 protocol (*Phys. Rev. Lett.* 68, 3121 (1992)) which includes a preprocessing step. The derivation for finite-size key is expressed as an optimization problem by using results of the uncertainty relations and the smooth Rényi entropies.

1. Introduction

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides the only physically secure and proven method for the transmission of a secret key between two distant parties, Alice and Bob [1, 2]. The goal of QKD is to guarantee that the possible eavesdropper known as Eve, with access to the communication channel is unable to obtain useful information about the message [2]. Since the invention of the BB84 protocol [1] which forms the most studied protocol, various protocols have been invented. Some of the common protocols are E91 [3], B92 [4] and SARG04 [5]. Moreover, the unconditional security proofs of these protocols against various attacks have been realized. In addition, various QKD products ave been realized. The tools for the possible study of unconditional security in the finite-key regime for all discrete variable protocols are now available in [6, 7]. Many efforts have been done to improve the bounds on the secret key rates for finite amount of resources [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Recently, a technique of using the uncertainty relations for the smooth entropies has been realized [13]. This approach has proved to be elegant because instead of providing bounds for coherent attacks, it provides bounds also for the general kind of attacks. Moreover, the uncertainty relation has direct applications in quantum cryptography and also this generalizes the results for the Shannon or von Neumann entropy.

The security bounds for the BB84 and the six-state protocols have been calculated using the smooth min-entropies in Ref [7, 8]. The secret key rate for the six-state protocol via Rényi entropies has been presented in Ref [12]. In this paper, we present bounds on the achievable key length for the B92 protocol [4] which involves a preprocessing step by using the uncertainty relations [13] and the Rényi entropies [14].

2. The B92 QKD Protocol

The B92 protocol [4] resembles symmetry like the BB84 and the six-state protocol. In contrast to the BB84 protocol which uses four states, the B92 protocol utilizes two non-orthogonal states.

By encoding in the non-orthogonal states of the quantum system, it makes it neither possible for the eavesdropper to make an exact copy of the system nor to gain partial information about the system without disturbing it. Below we describe the steps taken in the execution of the B92 protocol.

State preparation. Alice sends one of the two non-orthogonal states which we denote by $|\psi_{\pm}\rangle$, to Bob. Bob chooses randomly to measure one of the two von Neumann measurements. The first measurement projects onto the basis $|\psi_{+}\rangle$ which consists of the vectors $\{|\psi_{-}\rangle, |\tilde{\psi}_{-}\rangle\}$, where $|\tilde{\psi}_{-}\rangle$ is orthogonal to $|\psi_{-}\rangle$. The second measurement similarly projects onto the basis $|\psi_{-}\rangle$ which consist of the vectors $\{|\psi_{+}\rangle, |\tilde{\psi}_{+}\rangle\}$, where $|\tilde{\psi}_{+}\rangle$ is orthogonal to $|\psi_{+}\rangle$. Then Bob announces an acceptance if he gets an outcome which corresponds to $|\tilde{\psi}_{\pm}\rangle$, otherwise both parties discard the values that they recorded.

Sifting and Measurement. Alice records the bit value 0 or 1 if she sends $|\psi_{+}\rangle$ or $|\psi_{-}\rangle$ and Bob records 0 or 1 if he obtains $|\tilde{\psi}_{-}\rangle$ or $|\tilde{\psi}_{+}\rangle$. Alice sends each quantum state with equal probability and Bob chooses randomly with equal probability between his two measurements.

Parameter estimation. The role of the parameter estimation step is to minimize the set of compatible states Γ, given m sample points. Let $\Gamma_{\varepsilon_{\rm PE}}$ be a set of states from which a key is extracted with non-negligible probability where $\varepsilon_{\rm PE}$ is the failure probability in the parameter estimation step (i.e., the parameter estimation passes although the raw key does not contain sufficient secret information). In particular, if the statistics λ_m are obtained by measuring m samples of ρ_{AB} (i.e., the entangled state shared by Alice and Bob) according to a POVM measurement with d possible outcomes and $\lambda_{\infty}(\rho_{AB})$ denotes the perfect statistics in the limit of infinitely measurements then for any state ρ_{AB} [6]

$$\Gamma_{\xi} := \{\rho_{AB} : ||\lambda_m - \lambda_{\infty}(\rho_{AB})||_1 \leq \xi\}, \tag{1}$$

where by the Law of Large numbers [7]

$$\xi := \sqrt{\frac{\ln(1/\varepsilon_{\rm PE}) + 2\ln(m+1)}{2m}}. \tag{2}$$

Error correction. The error correction step serves the purpose of correcting all the erroneously received bits and giving an estimate of the error rate. Alice and Bob hold correlated bits strings denoted as X^n and Y^n. The number of bits leaked during the classical communication to an eavesdropper is given by [6, 8]

$$L_{\rm EC} = f_{\rm EC} n h(Q) + \log_2(\frac{2}{\varepsilon_{\rm EC}}), \tag{3}$$

where $f_{\rm EC}$ is a constant larger than 1 (in practice f ≈1.05 - 1.2), $h(Q)$ is the binary Shannon entropy, Q is the QBER and $\varepsilon_{\rm EC}$ is the error probability in the error correction step.

Privacy amplification. The objective of this step is to minimize the quantity of correct information which the eavesdropper may have obtained about Alice's and Bob's raw key. Let Alice (X) and Bob (Y) hold a perfectly correlated bit string X^n on which Eve (E) might have some information. Alice chooses at random a function $\mathcal{F}$ from a two universal hash functions and sends a description of $\mathcal{F}$ to Bob. Then Alice and Bob compute their keys $S_A = \mathcal{F}(X^n)$ and $S_B = \mathcal{F}(\hat{X}^n)$. By using an important result in [15], it has been found that the achievable length

of the secret key rate that can be computed from X by the two universal hash function $\mathcal{F}$ can be expressed as

$$\ell = H_{\max}^{\bar{\varepsilon}}(X|E) - H_{\min}^{\bar{\varepsilon}}(X|Y) - 2\log_2(1/\varepsilon), \tag{4}$$

where $\bar{\varepsilon} = (\varepsilon/8)^2$ and ε quantifies the security of the final key.

3. Definitions

3.1. Rényi entropies

The Rényi entropies are a family of functions on probability distributions. They quantify the uncertainty or randomness of a system. The Rényi entropy of order α is defined as [14]

$$H_\alpha(X) = \frac{1}{1-\alpha}\log\sum_{x\in\mathcal{X}} P(x)^\alpha, \quad \alpha \in (0,1)\cup(1,\infty), \tag{5}$$

for which $H_\infty(\alpha\to\infty)$, $H_0(\alpha\to 0)$ and the Shannon entropy ($\alpha\to 1$) are defined as limits. For a finite-dimensional Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}$, we use $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{H})$ to denote the set of positive semi-definite operators on $\mathcal{H}$. The set of normalized quantum states $\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}) := \{\rho \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{H}) : \mathrm{tr}\rho = 1\}$ and the set of sub-normalized states $\mathcal{S}_\leq(\mathcal{H}) := \{\rho \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{H}) : \mathrm{tr}\rho \leq 1\}$. We use indices to denote multi-partite Hilbert spaces for example, $\mathcal{H}_{AB} = \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$.

Definition 1. Let $\rho_{AB} \in S_\leq(\mathcal{H}_{AB})$ and $\sigma_B \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_B)$, then the min-entropy of A conditioned on B of the state ρ_{AB} relative to σ_B is defined as [7]

$$H_{\min}(A|B)_{\rho|\sigma} := \max_\sigma \sup\{\lambda \in \mathbb{R} : \rho_{AB} \leq 2^{-\lambda}\mathbb{1}_A \otimes \sigma_B\}, \tag{6}$$

where the maximum is taken over the states $\sigma_B \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_B)$. Furthermore, we define

$$H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho := \max_{\sigma_B\in\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_B)} H_{\min}(A|B)_{\rho|\sigma}. \tag{7}$$

The min-entropy, $H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho$ is finite if and only if $\mathrm{supp}\{\rho_B\} \subseteq \mathrm{supp}\{\sigma_B\}$ and $-\infty$ otherwise. The max-entropy is its dual with regards to a purification ρ_{ABC} of ρ_{AB} on an auxiliary Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}_C$.

Definition 2. Let $\rho_{ABC} \in S_\leq(\mathcal{H}_{ABC})$ be pure, then the max-entropy of A conditioned on B of the state ρ_{AB} is defined as

$$H_{\max}(A|B)_\rho := -H_{\min}(A|C)_\rho. \tag{8}$$

The quantum entropies can be ordered as follows

$$H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho \leq H(A|B)_\rho \leq H_{\max}(A|B)_\rho. \tag{9}$$

In order to define smooth versions, we consider the set of states close to ρ in the following sense. For $\varepsilon > 0$, we define an ε-ball of states around $\rho \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H})$ as

$$\mathcal{B}^\varepsilon(\rho) := \{\tilde{\rho} \in \mathcal{S}_\leq(\mathcal{H}) : C(\rho,\tilde{\rho}) \leq \varepsilon\}, \tag{10}$$

where $C(\rho,\tilde{\rho}) := \sqrt{1-F^2(\rho,\tilde{\rho})}$ is a distance measure (on normalized states) based on the fidelity $F(\rho,\tilde{\rho}) := \mathrm{tr}|\sqrt{\rho}\sqrt{\tilde{\rho}}|$. We use this choice of measure because it is invariant under purifications and is directly related to the trace distance for pure states. Smoothed versions of the min-entropy are then defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} H_{\min}^\varepsilon(A|B)_{\rho|\sigma} &:= \max_{\tilde{\rho}\in\mathcal{B}^\varepsilon(\rho_{AB})} H_{\min}(A|B)_{\tilde{\rho}|\sigma}, \\ H_{\min}^\varepsilon(A|B)_\rho &:= \max_{\tilde{\rho}\in\mathcal{B}^\varepsilon(\rho_{AB})} H_{\min}(A|B)_{\tilde{\rho}}, \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

and similarly

$$H_{\max}^{\varepsilon}(A|B)_{\rho} := \min_{\tilde{\rho}\in\mathcal{B}^{\varepsilon}(\rho_{AB})} H_{\max}(A|B)_{\tilde{\rho}}. \tag{12}$$

The Rényi entropies with $\alpha > 1$ are close to the smooth min-entropy in the sense that

$$H_{\min}^{\varepsilon}(X) \geq H_{\alpha}(X) - \frac{1}{\alpha - 1}\log\frac{1}{\varepsilon}, \quad \alpha > 1, \tag{13}$$

while those with $\alpha < 1$ are close to the smooth max-entropy.

3.2. Bound on the secure key rate

According to [7], for any $\varepsilon \geq 0$, a final key S is said to be ε-secure with respect to an adversary Eve if the joint state ρ_{SE} satisfies

$$\min_{\rho_E} \frac{1}{2}||\rho_{SE} - \tau_S \otimes \rho_E||_1 \leq \varepsilon, \tag{14}$$

where $\rho_{SE} = \sum_{s\in\mathcal{S}} P_s(s)|s\rangle\langle s| \otimes \rho_E^s$ and $\{|s\rangle\}_{s\in\mathcal{S}}$ is an orthonormal basis of some Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}_s$. The parameter τ_S is the completely mixed state on the key space, ρ_E is the state held by an eavesdropper, and $||\cdot||_1$ is the trace distance. The parameter ε, represents the maximum failure probability in which an adversary may have gained some information on S, or it can be interpreted as the maximum failure probability in which the extracted key deviates from the ideal key. The secret key rate in the asymptotic regime is expressed as

$$\lim_{N\to\infty} r = S(X|E) - H(X|Y), \tag{15}$$

where $S(X|E)$ and $H(X|Y)$ are the conditional von Neumann and the Shannon entropies [8]. However, in the non-asymptotic regime this equation becomes invalid as we have a finite number of bits that Alice sends to Bob. In the non-asymptotic limit, the secret key rate is found to be [6]

$$r = \frac{n}{N}\left[\min_{\sigma_{\mathrm{XE}}\in\Gamma} H(X|E) + \triangle - L_{\mathrm{EC}}\right] + \frac{2}{N}\log_2(2\varepsilon_{\mathrm{PA}}), \tag{16}$$

where $\triangle = (2\log_2 d + 3)\sqrt{[\log_2(2/\bar{\varepsilon})]/n}$. The total security parameter, ε of a QKD scheme depends on the sum of probabilities of failures of the classical post-processing protocols which can be written as

$$\varepsilon = \bar{\varepsilon} + \varepsilon_{\mathrm{PA}} + \varepsilon_{\mathrm{EC}} + \varepsilon_{\mathrm{PE}}, \tag{17}$$

where $\bar{\varepsilon}$ denotes the error in the smooth min-entropy and $\varepsilon_{\mathrm{PA}}$ is the probability of error in the privacy amplification step.

In order to determine the length ℓ, of ε-secure key bits that can be generated by this protocol we use the following results on the uncertainty relation [13]. The amount of key that can be extracted from a string X is given by uncertainty of the adversary about X, measured in terms of the smooth Rényi entropies. The amount of information B needs to correct his errors, using optimal error correction is given by his uncertainty about A's string again measured in terms of the smooth Rényi entropies. Combining these two results we have [16]

$$H_{\min}^{\bar{\varepsilon}}(\mathbf{X}|E) + H_{\max}^{\bar{\varepsilon}}(\mathbf{Z}|B) \geq \log\frac{1}{c}, \tag{18}$$

where $\bar{\varepsilon} \geq 0$ is the smoothing parameter and c quantifies the 'incompatibility' between the measurements $\mathbf{Z} = Z^{\otimes n}$ and $\mathbf{X} = X^{\otimes n}$. It is defined as $c = -\max_{x,z}||\sqrt{M_X}\sqrt{N_Z}||_{\infty}^2$, where



Figure 1. (Color online) Lower bound on the secret key fraction, r, for the finite B92 protocol as a function of the exchanged quantum signals N for bit errors Q= 0.5%, 2%, 2.5%, 5%. The maximum failure probability of the protocol is $\varepsilon = 10^{-5}$ and the failure probability of the error correction procedure is $\varepsilon_{\rm EC} = 10^{-10}$.

$\{M_X\}$ and $\{N_Z\}$ are POVM elements for preparing the state corresponding to $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$ basis respectively [16].

The definitions of the smooth min and max-entropies have been given above. The measure of uncertainty for Bob's measurement $H_{\max}$ can only increase under information processing such that

$$H^{\bar{\varepsilon}}_{\max}(\mathbf{Z}|B) \leq H^{\bar{\varepsilon}}_{\max}(\mathbf{Z}|\mathbf{Z}'), \tag{19}$$

where the measurement $\mathbf{Z}' = Z'^{\otimes n}$ is made on Bob's system [17]. The protocol does not need to prescribe the actual measurements of $\mathbf{Z}$ and $\mathbf{Z}'$. However, based on the observed parameters we can replace the measurement on $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{X}'$ in this hypothetical protocol by highly correlated measurements $\mathbf{Z}$ and $\mathbf{Z}'$ respectively. This means that the uncertainty in $H^{\bar{\varepsilon}}_{\max}(\mathbf{Z}|\mathbf{Z})$ is small and holds for the following bound on the smooth max-entropy

$$H^{\bar{\varepsilon}}_{\max}(\mathbf{Z}|\mathbf{Z}') \leq nh(Q), \tag{20}$$

where Q is the QBER. This result follows the argument in [16].

3.3. Bound on the achievable key length

Let ρ_{XBE} be the state describing Alice's bit string X^n and Bob's string B^n as well as Eve's quantum information represented by ρ_{E^n}. Let $\bar{\varepsilon}, \varepsilon_{\rm PA} \geq 0$. If the length of the key is such that

$$\ell \leq \max_{\bar{\varepsilon},\varepsilon_{\rm PA}} \left(H_{\min}(\mathbf{X}|E)_{\rho_{XBE}} - 2\log\frac{1}{2\bar{\varepsilon}} - 2\log\frac{1}{2\varepsilon_{\rm PA}} \right), \tag{21}$$

then the protocol is $(2\bar{\varepsilon} + \varepsilon_{\rm PA})$-secure.

By using the data processing inequality [7] and the uncertainty relation in (18) we have

$$\begin{aligned} H^{\bar{\varepsilon}}_{\min}(\mathbf{X}|E') &\geq H^{\bar{\varepsilon}}_{\min}(\mathbf{X}|E) - {\rm leak}_{\rm EC} \\ &\geq nq - H^{\bar{\varepsilon}}_{\max}(\mathbf{Z}|\mathbf{Z}') - {\rm leak}_{\rm EC} \\ &\geq nq - \frac{(1-2\delta)\eta + 2\delta}{2}(\varepsilon - (1-\varepsilon)h(x)) \\ &- nh(Q) - {\rm leak}_{\rm EC}, \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

where $q = \log 1/c$ is the quality factor and

$$x = \frac{(1-5\delta)(1-\delta)\eta(1-\eta)}{(\delta+(1-2\delta)\eta)(1-\delta)-(1-5\delta)\eta)},$$

where $\eta = (2\alpha\beta)^2$ and $\delta = 2/3p, (0 < p < 1)$, where p describes the amount of noise in the channel. The error rate conditioned on acceptance is given by $\varepsilon = \delta/(1-2\delta)\eta + 2\delta$, $\alpha \in (0, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}})$ and $\beta = \sqrt{1-\alpha^2}$ are complex vectors [18]. By substitution of Equation (22) into Equation (21), we find that the secret key rate r, varies with the number of signals N, as shown in Figure 1. Again, if we combine Equation (22) with the proposed bound on the achievable key length in Equation (21) and also by using the Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma [19] we have

$$\triangle \leq \bar{\varepsilon} + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2^{\ell - H_{\min}^{\bar{\varepsilon}}(X|E')}} \leq 2\bar{\varepsilon} + \varepsilon_{PA}, \tag{23}$$

where E' summarizes all information Eve learned about $\mathbf{X}$ during the protocol including the classical communication sent by Alice and Bob over the authenticated channel. This equation shows that one can extract a $\triangle$-secret key of length ℓ from X. This completes the proof for security bound for the B92 protocol.

4. Conclusion

We have demonstrated how one can use results of the uncertainty relations and smooth Rényi entropies to derive security bounds for the B92 QKD protocol when a finite number of signals are used. The results show that a minimum number of approximately $10^4 - 10^6$ signals are required in order to extract a reasonable length of secret key in QKD protocols under realistic scenarios. This minimum number has also been discussed in [6, 8, 9]. Therefore, the uncertainty relations and the smooth Rényi entropies prove to be a powerful technique for the derivation of the security bounds in QKD protocols in the finite size-key regime.

Acknowledgments

This work is based on research supported by the South African Research Chair Initiative of the Department of Science and Technology and National Research Foundation.

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